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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a severe influenza pandemic, many more patients would require 
the use of mechanical ventilators than can be accommodated with current 
supplies.  While federal and state ventilator stockpiles exist and New York 
state plans to buy additional ventilators that would meet the needs of pa-
tients in a moderately severe pandemic,1 existing stockpiles would be in-
adequate to meet the needs of a disaster on the scale of the 1918 influenza 
pandemic.2  Even if the vast number of ventilators needed for a disaster of 
that scale were purchased, the requisite amount of trained healthy staff and 
other resources, such as oxygen, may not be available due to the nature of 
the emergency.  Consequently, New York State and the rest of the country 
must proactively confront the rationing of resources in preparation for the 
possibility of severe ventilator scarcity in an influenza pandemic. 
In March 2007, a working group convened by the New York State 
Task Force on Life and the Law (Task Force) and the New York State De-
partment of Health released a draft guidance document entitled Allocation 
of Ventilators in an Influenza Pandemic (Ventilator Guidelines or Guide-
lines).3  The non-binding Guidelines contain a comprehensive clinical and 
ethical framework to guide distribution of ventilators in the event of a se-
vere public health emergency using objective medical criteria, with the ul-
timate goal of saving the most lives.  This document was among the first in 
the nation to confront this very sensitive and difficult topic,4 and other 
states have subsequently developed similar allocation plans.5 
                                                          
1. New York State Department of Health, Allocation of Ventilators in an Influenza Pandemic, Draft for 
Public Comment, 1, 11 (March 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/ventilators/docs/ventilator_guida
nce.pdf (hereinafter “Ventilator Guidelines”).  The recommendations included requirements that clinical 
evaluation be based upon universally applied objective criteria and that patients be equally subject to triage 
guidelines, regardless of their disease category or role in the community.  The Ventilator Guidelines also 
stressed the need for state-wide consistency to prevent inequalities between care facilities, the development 
of legal protections for providers who comply with the guidelines, and the availability of palliative care.). 
2. See The Great Pandemic, U.S. DEP‟T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., at 
www.flu.gov/pandemic/history/1918/the_pandemic/index.html (last visited February 5, 2013) (citing global 
mortality estimates between thirty and fifty million, and American mortality estimates at 675,000). 
3. See Ventilator Guidelines, supra note 1.  At the time of publication, the Task Force was undertaking an 
examination of contemporary ethical issues and clinical data, in order to release the second edition of the 
guidelines.  See New York State Department of Health, Task Force on Life & the Law Current Projects, at 
http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/current_projects/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).  The consider-
ations discussed in this article will form the basis of the legal section of the revised guidelines. 
4. Tia Powell et al., Allocation of Ventilators in a Public Health Disaster, 2 DISASTER MED. & PUB. 
HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 20, 20 (2008). 
5. See, e.g., Florida Department of Health, Pandemic Influenza: Triage and Scarce Resource Allocation 
Guidelines (Draft) (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/demo/bpr/PDFs/ACS-GUIDE-
Ver10-5.pdf; Dorothy E. Vawter et al., For the Good of Us All: Ethically Rationing Health Resources in 
Minnesota in a Severe Influenza Pandemic (2010), available at 
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Notably, and by necessity, the Guidelines represent a significant de-
parture from standard medical practice.  In a non-crisis setting, the prevail-
ing medical standard of care focuses on the needs of each individual pa-
tient and is centered on the principle of informed consent.  In a public 
health emergency, however, such concentrated care may be impossible or 
inadvisable due to: (1) resource limitations and (2) the goal of saving as 
many lives as possible.  The Guidelines acknowledge that health care pro-
viders may be hesitant to conform to the crisis medical standard of care 
contained therein due to concerns about liability arising from injury or 
death.6  Adhering to the Guidelines – despite their significant public health 
goals – may expose health care providers and entities to considerable costs 
and burdens, including the risk of jail time and/or financial penalties, the 
time and costs of discovery and preparing a case, higher medical malprac-
tice insurance rates, and damage to one‟s reputation, unless proper and 
adequate legal protections are in place. 
This article addresses the issue of liability for health care workers and 
entities who adhere to the recommended clinical protocol contained in the 
Ventilator Guidelines while rendering care in a disaster emergency, which 
has been characterized as one of the “most challenging legal questions re-
lated to the pandemic.”7  After considering in Section II of the “trigger” for 
implementing emergency plans – a declaration of a public health or disas-
ter emergency – Section III explores current federal and state law that 
might offer immunity, defense, or indemnification to certain individuals or 
entities who provide care in response to that declaration.  The article then 
turns in Section IV to a consideration of several unique alternative ap-
proaches to mitigate clinicians‟ and other entities‟ burdens in the event of 
a civil lawsuit.  Section V addresses issues of potential criminal liability 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/ethics/ethics.pdf; Utah Department of Health, Utah Pandemic 
Influenza Plan (2007), available at http://pandemicflu.utah.gov/plan/CorePanFlu-10012007.pdf. See also 
Gianfranco Pezzino, Guide for Planning the Use of Scarce Resources During a Public Health Emergency 
in Kansas, at 10 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.kdheks.gov/cphp/download/ 
GuideforPlanningUseofScarceResources.pdf. 
6. This may be of particular concern where they recommend ventilator withdrawal without patient consent.  
Some commentators have asserted that there may be a legal distinction between withholding and withdraw-
ing life-sustaining treatments or therapies (such as ventilators), and have noted the potential for increased 
liability concerns with the latter.  See Philip D. Levin & Charles L. Sprung, Withdrawing and Withholding 
Life-Sustaining Therapies are Not the Same, 9 CRITICAL CARE 230 (2005); Ventilator Guidelines, supra 
note 1.  But see American Medical Association, Opinion 2.20 - Withholding or Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion220.page (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) (“There is no ethical distinction be-
tween withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment.”); Asha Devereaux et al., Summary of Sug-
gestions from the Task Force for Mass Critical Care Summit, January 26-27, 2007, 133 CHEST 1S, 6S 
(2008) (“Rationing should apply equally to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments based 
on the principle that withholding and withdrawing care are ethically equivalent”). 
7. Ventilator Guidelines, supra note 1, at 3. 
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and Section VI culminates in recommendations for legislation granting 
adequate civil and criminal liability protections to health care workers and 
entities who adhere to the state‟s Ventilator Guidelines in a pandemic. 
Although this article focuses on New York State law and policy, just 
as the Ventilator Guidelines served as the basis for other states‟ scarce re-
source allocation plans, the issues considered here are applicable in other 
jurisdictions – just as the clinical and ethical guidance in the Ventilator 
Guidelines themselves – in order to encourage appropriate behavior in a 
severe pandemic event. 
II. EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
A governmental declaration of a disaster or public health emergency 
might both signal the applicability of emergency plans and guidelines and 
make available some liability protections for certain health care workers 
and entities who provide care during the emergency.8  At the federal level, 
the President of the United States can declare a federal state of emergency 
or major disaster in accordance with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act (“the Stafford Act”)9 or the National 
Emergencies Act.10  The Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
may also declare a public health emergency in the case of disease, disord-
er, or bioterrorist attack.11 
In addition, every state has a procedure for declaring a state of emer-
gency, disaster, or crisis.12  In New York State, the Governor has the au-
thority, pursuant to Article 2-B of the New York State Executive Law 
(“the Disaster Act”),13 to declare a state of emergency whenever “a disaster 
has occurred or may be imminent for which local governments are unable 
to respond adequately.”14  The Disaster Act confers certain response duties 
                                                          
8. Emergency declarations may also trigger the availability of resources, such as stockpiles, that are only 
available in emergencies. 
9. Federal Emergency Management Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208 (2000). 
10. Declaration of National Emergency by President, 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).  President Bush declared an 
emergency under the National Emergencies Act after the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
11. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2011).  The Secretary declared public heath emergencies 
in reaction to the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina. 
12. In addition to general emergency procedures, some states have protocols for public health emergencies, 
which trigger various additional powers, including changing the functions of state governmental agencies.  
New York does not have a public health emergency statute delineated as such, nor is “public health emer-
gency” defined in New York law or administrative regulations.  Enacting such a statute might clarify the 
authority of the Governor and/or Health Commissioner in declaring a crisis medical standard of care or 
modified immunity standards for health care workers who provide care during an emergency. 
13. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20 (McKinney 2012). 
14. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 28(1) (McKinney 2012) (the New York State and Local Natural Disaster and Man-
Made Disaster Act). 
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and obligations on the state in a declared emergency15 and includes broad 
powers to cope with such a crisis.  Notably, although the Department of 
Health has authority over the institutional aspects of medical care and is 
empowered to issue binding regulations for hospitals that would apply to 
standards of care, it generally does not have the power to regulate the pri-
vate practice of medicine.16 
The Disaster Act describes the power to issue executive orders, or 
rules to be followed during the pendency of the emergency;17 the governor 
“may by executive order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any 
statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or parts the-
reof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with 
such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope 
with the disaster.”18  Any suspension of civil or criminal law is valid for 
thirty days, with an additional possible extension of thirty days.19 
The ability to suspend relevant laws pursuant to the Disaster Act, 
however, is limited.  First, the Governor may not suspend a law that safe-
guards public health and welfare that is not “reasonably necessary” to the 
                                                          
15. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 22(3)(b) (McKinney 2012).  For example, the Act lays out a number of response 
plans to be implemented by the state, including (“but not limited to”), “plans for the continued effective 
operation of the civil and criminal justice systems” and “utilization and coordination of programs to assist 
victims of disasters….” 
16. For example, under New York law, in hospitals and other health care facilities subject to Public Health 
Law Article 28, the Commissioner of Health has some discretionary power to regulate aspects of medical 
practice. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803 (McKinney 2012).  Where a proposed regulation would relate to 
the private practice of medicine, however, the Education Law would seem to forbid its promulgation, even 
in an emergency.  N.Y. EDUC. LAW  § 6532 prohibits the Department of Health (as well as the Department 
of Education) from promulgating rules or regulations concerning the practice of physicians who are li-
censed and authorized to practice their profession under the state‟s Education Law. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 
6520-6529 (McKinney 2012).  Even if the Department of Health could promulgate new rules or regula-
tions, it would not have the authority to enforce such regulations unless the Education Law was also 
amended to include violation of that regulation in its grounds for professional misconduct.  N.Y. EDUC. 
LAW § 6530 (McKinney 2012).  For example, when the law governing office-based surgery (“OBS”) was 
passed, which required the accreditation of OBS and established requirements for reporting adverse events, 
the Education Law also had to be amended to add a new ground for professional misconduct for violation 
of N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230-d (McKinney 2012). 
17. Similarly, in Colorado, a list of draft executive orders has been drafted to be signed and used by the 
Governor in the event of a public health emergency. The Governor‟s Expert Emergency Epidemic Re-
sponse Committee (“GEEERC”) was statutorily created in 2000 to develop a public health response to “acts 
of bioterrorism, pandemic influenza and epidemics caused by novel and highly fatal infectious agents.” See 
Colo. Rev. Stat.  § 24-32-2104(8) (2010).  For a list of the state‟s draft executive orders, see Colorado De-
partment of Public Health & Environment, Governor’s Expert Emergency Epidemic Response Committee 
Draft Executive Orders (Apr. 26, 2006), available at  
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/epr/Public/InternalResponsePlan/Attachment3.pdf. 
18. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2012).  There are a number of instances where the New York State 
governor has suspended statutes during declared emergency.  For example, in the aftermath of September 
11, Governor Pataki temporarily suspended and modified statutory provisions related to the mandatory re-
tirement of members of the state police.  N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. Tit. 9, § 5.113.36-A (Oct. 16, 2001).  
Governor Pataki also suspended the speedy trial deadlines of Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30. 
19. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a(2)(a) (McKinney 2012). 
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disaster effort.20  Second, the Disaster Act does not allow suspension of 
rights granted by the federal or state constitutions,21 such as those related 
to due process, equal protection, or governmental takings.22  Third, most 
civil (including much of the law regarding informed consent, physician-
patient relationships, and medical malpractice) and some criminal liabili-
ties are not detailed by statute but are the product of common law (i.e., 
case law and precedent), and therefore may not be suspended by the gov-
ernor pursuant to the Disaster Act.23 
In contrast to statutes, agency regulations and guidelines can be sus-
pended without invocation of the governor‟s emergency powers.24  An 
agency may also adopt a temporary emergency rule without normal notice 
and comment procedures.25  An agency may not promulgate a rule under 
the emergency power if it could not promulgate that same rule under nor-
mal rule-making procedures, and a notice of emergency adoption mustcite 
the statutory authority under which the rule is adopted.26  Emergency rules 
                                                          
20. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 
29-a(2)(b) (McKinney 2012). 
21. See, e.g., DeBari v. Town of Middleton, 9 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).  
22. One of the takings issues associated with the guidelines includes the authority to appropriate privately 
owned (by individuals with a chronic disease or by private hospitals) ventilators.  See Joint Meeting of the 
Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC), and CDC‟s Public Health Ethics Committee, Minutes, at 2 (October 15, 2009). 
23. Significant attention must be paid to any governor‟s orders arising from a declaration of disaster emer-
gency, particularly those related to when a lawsuit is commenced, tried, or resolved after the expiration of 
the suspensions order.  After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Governor Pataki declared a disaster emer-
gency and implemented various forms of relief, including suspending a criminal law that requires the gov-
ernment to announce their readiness for trial within six months of the commencement of a felony action.  
N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. Tit. 9, § 5.113.7 (2001).  Under the Executive Orders, the time period allot-
ted to the People to announce they were ready for trial (i.e., 90 days for a class A misdemeanor) did not 
include any excludable time.  After September 11, many suits arose disputing the contours of the suspen-
sion, particularly regarding how the speedy trial time should be calculated. People v. Forbes, 745 N.Y.S.2d 
414 (2002); People v. Wright, 748 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2002). It was clear from the Executive Orders that, if the 
limitation period ended during the pendency of the Executive Orders, the case would not be dismissed pur-
suant to CPL § 30.30. People v. Pena, 2002 NY Slip Op. 40129U, 10-11, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 394 
(2002).  The court held that in cases in which the Orders did not clarify the effect of the final day of the 
speedy trial time falling after the time frame established therein, that the Orders require some analysis as to 
whether a delay requested by the People might constitute a delay due to “exceptional circumstances” be-
cause it related to the World Trade Center emergency. 
24. New York‟s Administrative Procedure Act provides for emergency adoption of rules by an agency if it 
“is necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety or general welfare,” where there is appropriate 
statutory authority for such an adoption.  N.Y. A.P.A. § 202(6) (McKinney 2012).  Thus, the Department of 
Health could, among other things, suspend its own regulations. 
25. Id. (“[I]f an agency finds that the immediate adoption of a rule is necessary for the preservation of the 
public health, safety or general welfare and that compliance with the requirements of subdivision one of 
this section [describing the normal notice and comment requirements for rule making] would be contrary to 
the public interest, the agency may dispense with all or part of such requirements and adopt the rule on an 
emergency basis.”). 
26. Id. § 202(6)(d)(i). 
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are in effect for ninety days,27 but may be readopted on an emergency ba-
sis.28 
In planning for a pandemic, it may be useful to identify statutes,29 
regulations, and guidelines30 that might be suspended in an influenza pan-
demic, which may conflict with effectively implementing the Ventilator 
Guidelines.31 
III. EXISTING CIVIL LIABILITY PROTECTIONS 
In adhering to guidelines recommending modified behavior during an 
emergency, both individuals and entities face potential liability under a 
number of civil and criminal theories.  Civil claims could encompass lia-
bility for negligence, professional malpractice, breach of contract, breach 
                                                          
27. Id. § 202(6)(b). 
28. Id. § 202(6)(e). 
29. The following is a non-exclusive compilation of some of the state statutes that might be waived in or-
der to effectively implement the Guidelines: N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d (“Private Actions by Pa-
tients of Residential Health Care Facilities”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c (“Rights of Patients in Cer-
tain Medical Facilities”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(2)(a); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW Art. 29-B 
(“Orders Not to Resuscitate for Residents of Mental Hygiene Facilities”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 29-C 
(“Health Care Agents and Proxies”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW Art. 29-CC (“Family Health Care Decisions 
Act”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW Art. 29-CCC (“Nonhospital Orders Not to Resuscitate”); N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 6530 (“Definitions of Professional Misconduct”).  As noted above, the State Education Department regu-
lates the “professional conduct” for licensed health care workers, while the Department regulates hospitals.  
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6504.  Article 131-A of the State Education Law governs the professional misconduct 
in the practice of medicine.  A suspension of the laws governing negligent practice might ease the pressure 
on health care workers who provide care pursuant to the Ventilator Guidelines. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 
defines professional misconduct of physicians, physician‟s assistants, and specialist‟s assistants, as (among 
other definitions) “[p]racticing the profession with negligence on more than one occasion.” N.Y. EDUC. 
LAW § 6509 defines professional misconduct for other professions, as (among other things) “negligence or 
incompetence on more than one occasion.”  However, the law allows charges to “be dismissed in the inter-
est of justice,” thereby potentially rendering suspension of the law unnecessary.  It is also possible that a 
declaration of a state of emergency may allow the governor to modify or suspend New York Civil Practice 
Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.) – particularly as they apply to discovery – in order to ameliorate the burden on 
health care workers who adhere to the Guidelines.  However, this proposal is problematic on a number of 
levels.  First, it might be challenging to fit suspension of civil discovery rules into the Disaster Act‟s re-
quirement that “[n]o suspension shall be made which does not safeguard the health and welfare of the pub-
lic and which is not reasonably necessary to the disaster effort,” because there is little to no instructive case 
law on what constitutes “reasonably necessary.”  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(1)(g)(2)(ii).  Second, the effects of 
such an order would be subject to the Act‟s requirement that no suspension be made for a period in excess 
of thirty days, and – even if extended – would only be in effect during the duration of the declared state of 
emergency. 
30. Guidelines, like those in the draft 2007 report, differ from regulations, which are binding rules or stan-
dards promulgated by government agencies (like the New York State Department of Health).  Under New 
York law, a regulation is “a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without re-
gard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statute it administers.”  In re 
Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Board, 872 N.Y.S.2d 419 
(2008); In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 66 N.Y.2d 948 (1985).  
Laws, on the other hand, are created by statutes that originate from legislative bills in the state or federal 
legislature. 
31. Ventilator Guidelines, supra note 1, at 39-40. 
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of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other in-
tentional torts (including battery).32 
The elements of a negligence claim (the most likely of these civil 
claims) are: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) 
breach of that duty, (3) harm or injury to the plaintiff, and (4) a causal link 
between the injury and the breach of duty.33  The defendant‟s duty to the 
plaintiff is defined by the legal standard of care.  For personal negligence 
claims – particularly those based in medical malpractice – against individ-
ual physicians, New York courts apply the “prudent doctor standard,” re-
quiring that the physician exercise due care, “as measured against the con-
duct of his or her own peers.”34  The state generally applies the “same 
community” standard to this determination, wherein the state‟s case law 
specifies that practice in the local community determines the standard of 
care.35 
Moreover, health care providers may be alleged to have committed 
gross negligence under a crisis standard of care that arises in a pandemic.  
Under New York law, gross negligence is more than just an egregious 
form of negligence and can more appropriately be defined as willful mis-
conduct or intentional wrongdoing.  Gross negligence differs “in kind, not 
only degree, from claims of ordinary negligence” and is “conduct that 
evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or „smacks‟ of inten-
tional wrongdoing.”36 
With respect to entities – including hospitals, clinics, and health care 
organizations – claims are likely to sound in corporate negligence and vi-
                                                          
32. Except where a federal cause of action is established by statute, medical malpractice claims are go-
verned by state common law.  The State‟s informed consent doctrine is premised on battery.  Schloendorff 
v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 126 (1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”). 
33. Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1926 (2008). 
34. McCullough v. Univ. Rochester Strong Mem. Hosp., 794 N.Y.S.2d 237 (2005); Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 
97 N.Y.2d 398 (2002); Caristo v. Sanzone, 96 N.Y.2d 174 (2001) (applying the common-law emergency 
doctrine, whereby an individual faced with “a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or 
no time for thought, deliberation or consideration” is judged on whether the response is that of a reasonably 
prudent person under the circumstances). 
35. In some cases, courts have deviated from applying the locality rule and instead sometimes apply a min-
imum statewide standard of care or even a nationwide standard.  For further discussion, see Michelle Huck-
aby Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs. The National 
Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633 (2007). 
36. Colnaghi, USA Ltd. v. Jewelers Protection Servs., Ltd., 81 N.Y.2d 821 (1993).  Contractual releases 
from gross negligence are likely not enforceable in New York in any event.  David Shine, Contractual Ap-
plications of Negligence/Gross Negligence Standards: Considerations Under New York Law, THE M&A 
LAWYER (2005), available at 
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/056EFA672B52519D1926370EFAF84809.pdf. 
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carious liability.37  A corporate negligence theory requires a showing of: 
(1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty by deviating from the standard 
of care; (3) actual or constructive notice of the defects or procedures that 
caused the harm; and (4) a causal link between the conduct and harm.38  
The entity‟s duty of care includes maintaining safe and adequate facilities, 
hiring only competent physicians, overseeing all persons who practice 
medicine under its auspices, and formulating and enforcing appropriate 
rules and policies to ensure quality care for patients.  A vicarious liability 
claim may arise against a hospital or other health care entity for the acts of 
an independent physician where the physician was provided by the hospit-
al or was otherwise acting on the hospital‟s behalf, and the patient reason-
ably believed that the physician was acting at the hospital‟s behest.39 
At both the state and federal level, no uniform legal protection exists 
for the provision of care pursuant to disaster plans or guidance during a 
health crisis.  For example, although current laws offer some legal safe-
guards for health care workers and entities, they vary according to the 
population they cover.  Many apply only to unpaid volunteers,40 while 
fewer offer protections for compensated health care providers.  At best, 
they provide immunity from a finding of liability.  Likewise, the various 
laws provide different levels of protection: some laws provide civil liabili-
ty immunity while others indemnify providers.  Notably, no federal or 
New York State law provides immunity from suit altogether.  Further, the 
majority of applicable laws protect providers conditionally (e.g., if the de-
fendant has not engaged in willful or intentional misconduct or gross neg-
ligence), rather than offering unconditional protections against liability. 
 
                                                          
37. Vicarious liability refers to the responsibility of superiors for the acts of subordinates, and is particular-
ly applicable in the hospital context. 
38. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1918 (discussing Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 
1982) (hospital held liable under the doctrine of corporate negligence where independent contractors negli-
gently performed pediatric surgery at the hospital); Insinga v. Labella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (re-
cognizing the corporate negligence doctrine as the independent duty the hospital owes to patients, and find-
ing that because the hospital is in “a superior position to supervise and monitor physician performance,” it 
is “the only entity that can realistically provide quality control.”); Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l 
Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965); Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989) (hospital 
and governing board may be liable for failure to supervise treatment by non-employed physicians under 
corporate negligence theory of liability); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984) (expressly adopt-
ing corporate negligence theory)). 
39. Sarivola v. Brookdale Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 612 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1994); Soltis v. 
State, 568 N.Y.S.2d 470 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 1991). 
40. Broadly, volunteers are health care workers from unaffected areas who may provide assistance in a 
place of emergency, or retirees or students with medical training who volunteer their services during a de-
clared disaster emergency.  “Spontaneous” untrained volunteers are less of a concern in cases concerning 
ventilator allocation in a flu pandemic than in dealing with other public health emergencies, and will there-
fore not be addressed here.  See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1957-58. 
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A. Federal Law 
Two primary pieces of legislation offer some liability protections to 
health care workers and entities that provide care during a public health 
emergency: the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (“PREP”) 
Act and the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (“VPA”). 
1. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) 
Enacted in 2005, the PREP Act limits tort liability under state and 
federal law with respect to the use of “covered countermeasures” for pan-
demic flu or other public health threats.41  Specifically, upon a determina-
tion by the Secretary of HHS that either a public health emergency or the 
credible risk of such emergency exists, the Secretary may issue a declara-
tion that certain “covered persons” are immune from liability with respect 
to claims arising from the administration or use of a covered countermea-
sure.42  Covered persons will not be held liable unless a “death or serious 
physical injury” was caused by “willful misconduct.”43  Covered persons 
include manufacturers, distributors, and program planners of countermea-
sures (i.e., individuals and entities involved in planning and administering 
programs for distribution of a countermeasure), as well as qualified per-
sons who prescribe, administer, or dispense countermeasures (i.e., health 
care and other providers); and theUnited States.  To the extent that life-
sustaining equipment, such as mechanical ventilators, meets the criteria to 
be considered covered countermeasures, their appropriate use could quali-
fy a provider for immunity from liability, so long as the providers‟ activi-
ties are part of a response plan and fall within the purview of a declaration 
by the Secretary of HHS in effect at the time.44 
                                                          
41. Targeted Liability Protections for Pandemic and Epidemic Products and Security Countermeasures, 42 
U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2005). 
42. Id. 
43. Under the PREP Act, “willful misconduct” is defined as an act or omission that is taken “(i) intention-
ally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disre-
gard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh 
the benefit.” Public Readiness & Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A) (2005).  The 
Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, “shall promulgate regulations . . . that further 
restrict the scope of actions or omissions by a covered person that may qualify as „willful misconduct.‟” 42 
U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(2)(A) (2005).  Furthermore, “the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence willful misconduct by each covered person sued and that such willful misconduct 
caused death or serious physical injury.”  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(3) (2005).  The “clear and convincing” 
standard is higher than the proof by a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, the usual burden of proof 
in civil cases. 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1) (2005).  However, the wording of the PREP Act declaration “suggests that 
liability extends to federal contracts, etc. and activities authorized in response to a public health emergency; 
requirement of both elements would limit liability to only federal programs and not extend to state pro-
grams.”  CDC Public Health Law Program, After-Action Report: Legal Issues and the H1N1 Influenza 
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However, the scope of the PREP Act is ambiguous.45  As an initial 
matter, although there is a strong argument that the establishment of a tri-
age protocol for ventilators in a pandemic qualifies as a program for “the 
administration, dispensing, distribution, provision, or use of a security 
countermeasure or a qualified pandemic or epidemic product,” it remains 
unclear whether a ventilator would qualify as a covered countermeasure.46  
The PREP Act appears to be designed to insulate manufacturers and enti-
ties in the production, supply, and delivery of faulty countermeasures, such 
as an ineffective or contaminated anti-viral medication, which may have 
been rushed to market because of a public health emergency.47  Attempting 
to apply the PREP Act protections to allocation of a fully-functioning 
countermeasure such as ventilators is not guaranteed.  Additionally, the 
statutory language of the PREP Act immunizes against affirmative admin-
istration of relevant measures; it is unclear whether it would apply equally 
to inaction regarding such measures.  More specifically, the PREP Act 
protections may not extend to the withholding of a ventilator or other 
countermeasures pursuant to a state‟s emergency response plan.48 
Accordingly, unless and until the Secretary of HHS approves for 
PREP Act protection of a plan by New York or another state that includes 
not only affirmative usage of ventilators, but also withholding or with-
drawal of ventilator support, it may be unwise to rely on the PREP Act for 
full liability protection to ensure compliance with the Guidelines. 
2. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (VPA) 
The VPA provides immunity against liability for tort claims to volun-
teers who do not receive compensation in excess of $500 per year and who 
serve governmental entities and nonprofit organizations.49  However, as 
with most immunity-conferring laws, the VPA does not cover harm caused 
by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, 
                                                                                                                                          
Pandemic, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, at 13 (Apr. 30, 2010), at 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/H1N1/upload/043010-H1N1-Legal-Issues-After-Action-Report.pdf. 
45. Notably, because the PREP Act has been untested in court, the full extent of its protections is unclear. 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(6) (2005). 
47. See, e.g., Eva B. Stensvad, Note, Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and Preemp-
tion of Design Defect Claims, 95 MINN. L. REV. 315, 335 (2011). 
48. After-Action Report: Legal Issues and the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, supra note 44, at 13.  Further, if 
the countermeasure (or withholding of the countermeasure) is mandated by the state, the PREP Act may not 
apply.  See id. (“PREP Act coverage requires that the countermeasures be voluntary; would coverage still 
be extended should a state mandate that all healthcare workers, for example, be vaccinated”). 
49. Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (1997).  Government entities are generally un-
derstood to be the United States or any state, the District of Columbia, a U.S. possession (including Puerto 
Rico), a political subdivision of a state or U.S. possession, or an Indian tribal government or any of its sub-
divisions that perform substantial government functions. 
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or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual 
harmed by the volunteer.50  The VPA also includes a list of exceptions to 
the Act‟s liability limitations, including for crimes of violence or acts of 
international terrorism, hate crimes, sexual offenses, or violations of feder-
al or state civil rights law.51  For the VPA‟s immunity protections to apply, 
a volunteer must be properly licensed, certified, or authorized by the ap-
propriate state authorities, and the volunteer‟s activities must be underta-
ken within the scope of his or her responsibilities.52  The Act preempts any 
inconsistent state law, but does not preempt state law that provides addi-
tional protection from liability for volunteers.53  Notably, the VPA‟s pro-
tections do not depend on a declaration of emergency. 
The VPA‟s liability limitations do not apply to nonprofit organiza-
tions or governmental entities that may be held vicariously liable for the 
ordinary negligence of their volunteers, even if volunteers themselves are 
immune.54  Moreover, the Act explicitly permits nonprofit organizations or 
government entities to bring a civil action against the volunteer.55  Thus, it 
is entirely possible that an injured person could sue the entity responsible 
for the volunteer‟s involvement (under, for example, a vicarious liability 
theory), and the entity could then, in turn, sue the volunteer to recover the 
damages it had paid to the victim.  Thus, the VPA‟s immunity provisions 
do not provide wholesale liability protections to those who provide care in 
a pandemic and almost certainly does not provide protections for frontline 
providers, such as hospitalists, for whom the Guidelines are aimed. 
B. New York State Law 
The Disaster Act, Good Samaritan Laws, and Public Officers Law of-
fer protections – albeit incomplete ones – for health care workers and enti-
ties in a pandemic.56 
                                                          
50. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a)(3). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(f). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 14505. 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 14502. 
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14503(c) (“No Effect on Liability of Organization or Entity. – Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to affect the liability of any nonprofit organization or governmental entity with respect to 
harm caused to any person”). 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(b) (1997) (“Concerning Responsibility of Volunteers to Organizations and Entities. 
– Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any civil action brought by any nonprofit organization 
or any governmental entity against any volunteer of such organization or entity.”). 
56. In addition, the New York State Defense Emergency Act (“SDEA”), provides a grant of immunity for 
civil defense workers for actions taken “in good faith carrying out, complying with or attempting to comply 
with any law, any rule, regulation or order duly promulgated or issued pursuant to” the SDEA and “relating 
to civil defense, including but not limited to activities pursuant thereto, in preparation for anticipated attack, 
during attack, or following attack or false warning thereof, or in connection with an authorized drill or test.”  
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Importantly, because issues of malpractice and other liability are not 
detailed bystate statute,57 the state may not be able to provide additional 
liability protectionto health care providers based on the declaration of an 
emergency by order alone.58  Moreover, no state action would insulate 
health care workers from liability for breaches of federal law.  For exam-
ple, state action could not protect health care workers from alleged 
HIPAA59 or EMTALA60 violations.  Liability under federal law can be 
waived only by a declaration of a national public health emergency by the 
President or the Secretary of HHS.61  Likewise, constitutional claims alleg-
ing violations of due process, equal protection, or takings law would not 
be addressed by an application of state law as a result of a state declaration 
of emergency. 
1. The Disaster Act 
In addition to permitting the governor to declare a state of emergen-
cy, New York‟s Disaster Act grants civil immunity to actions taken by cer-
tain individuals “for any claim based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of any officer or employee in carrying out” the law.62  Courts have 
held that in enacting the statute, the legislature intended to grant only im-
                                                                                                                                          
N.Y. LAW § 113 (CONSOL. 2012).  The immunity provision also extends to government, partnerships, and 
corporations, as well as individuals. Although the governor may invoke the SDEA following an “attack,” 
pandemics are considered relatively foreseeable and would probably not qualify under the SDEA.  2008 
Pandemic Influenza Plan New York State Department of Health, Command and Control, NEW YORK STATE 
DEP‟T OF HEALTH (2008), at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/plan/docs/section_1.pdf.  In the 
New York Court of Appeals‟ only case addressing the SDEA‟s immunity provisions, the court noted that, 
“[l]iability is the rule, immunity the exception . . . The rule of non-liability is out of tune with life about us, 
at variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing.” Abbott v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 245 N.E.2d 388, 390 n. 2 (N.Y. 1969) (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957) (alterations in 
original)). 
57. This excludes the Tort Claims Act for public employees and the Good Samaritan Acts. See N.Y. Ct. 
Claims Act §§ 8-12, 15, 20-a, 26. 
58. Donna Levin et al., Altered Standards of Care During an Influenza Pandemic: Identifying Ethical, Le-
gal, and Practical Principles to Guide Decision Making, 3 (Supp. 2) DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH 
PREPAREDNESS S132, S133 (2009), available at 
http://www.dmphp.org/cgi/content/full/3/Supplement_2/S132. 
59. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160 et seq.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides federal protections 
for personal health information held by covered entities and gives patients an array of rights with respect to 
that information. 
60. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C § 1395dd(a).  EMTALA requires that 
hospital emergency rooms screen all patients who seek emergency treatment. 
61. In order to waive HIPAA and EMTALA mandates, the President may issue emergency declarations 
allowing the HHS Secretary to act. 
62. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 25(5) (McKinney 2012).  See also In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 
F. Supp. 2d 520, 558 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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munity from liability – not immunity from suit.63  In other words, covered 
parties can still be sued and forced to go to court for civil liability allega-
tions that arise out of care provided in a declared emergency, but the Dis-
aster Act may prevent a finding of liability.  Liability protections also 
would be unlikely to extend beyond political subdivisions and their em-
ployees and officers; at least one court has opined that “[h]ad the legisla-
ture intended for immunity to extend to private [compensated non-
government] actors, it could easily have so provided.”64  Recently, the Dis-
aster Act‟s immunity provisions were modified to also apply to local “affi-
liated” volunteers acting within the scope of duties set forth in a Compre-
hensive Emergency Management Plan, to the extent that a formal 
“affiliation” has been established.65  It is unclear whether the Act would 
cover clinicians‟ conduct if their actions occurred within the normal scope 
of duties.  Paradoxically, such clinicians would be the exact health care 
providers who would likely be sued for following the Guidelines. 
2. New York State Good Samaritan Laws 
Under New York‟s Good Samaritan laws, physicians, physician as-
sistants, dentists, physical therapists, nurses, and podiatrists who provide 
care at the scene of an accident or emergency are immune from civil liabil-
ity claims.66  However, such laws apply only to care provided outside a 
hospital, doctor‟s office, or other place having proper and necessary medi-
cal equipment.67  Moreover, the state‟s Good Samaritan laws apply to only 
voluntary and uncompensated individuals, and not to professionals acting 
in the context of their normal duties or with a pre-established duty of care 
to the patient.68  Consequently, Good Samaritan laws exclude a major por-
                                                          
63. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 558. 
64. Id. 
65. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20(2)(g) (McKinney 2012) (defining “disaster emergency response personnel” un-
der N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-b(1) as “agencies, public officers, employees, or affiliated volunteers having du-
ties and responsibilities under or pursuant to a comprehensive emergency management plan.”). 
66. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3000-a(1) (McKinney 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527 (McKinney 2012) 
(applying non-liability to licensed physicians providing voluntary and uncompensated first aid or emergen-
cy treatment at the scene of an accident or other emergency outside a hospital, doctor‟s office, or any other 
place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill, or injured), Id. 
at § 6547 (stating that a physician assistant rendering first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an 
accident or outside a hospital or doctor‟s office is not liable for damages, injuries, or death unless it is es-
tablished that the injuries or death are caused by gross negligence), Id. at § 6737 (applying non-liability for 
licensed physical therapists for first aid or emergency treatment), Id. at § 6909 (applying non-liability for 
nurses for providing uncompensated first aid or emergency treatment), Id. at § 7006 (applying non-liability 
for podiatrists for providing uncompensated first aid or emergency treatment), Id. at § 6611. 
67. Id. 
68. Generally, volunteers are covered by Good Samaritan laws only if they are not compensated.  Hoff-
man, supra note 33, at 1952. 
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tion of those health care professionals who provide care within a hospital 
setting and/or as part of their employment – the most likely caregivers in a 
disaster scenario.69  In addition, New York‟s Good Samaritan laws do not 
provide liability protections to entities such as hospitals and businesses or 
insulate health care providers from criminal liability.70 
3. New York Public Officers Law § 17 
New York Public Officers Law Section 17 provides for both the de-
fense and the indemnification of New York State “employees.”  “Em-
ployee” is somewhat broadly defined, and health care providers may be 
covered if they are “volunteer[s] expressly authorized to participate in a 
state-sponsored volunteer program.”71  New York Public Health Law Sec-
tion 14 extends Section 17 to any physician, dentist, nurse, or other health 
care professional who “is licensed to practice pursuant to [New York State 
Education Law] and who is rendering professional treatment or consulta-
tion in connection with professional treatment authorized under such li-
cense at the request of the Department, or at a departmental facility.”72 
Under Section 17, the State‟s duty to defend is broader than its duty 
to indemnify.  The law requires New York State to provide for the defense 
of its employees “in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal 
court arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or is al-
leged in the complaint to have occurred while the employee was acting 
within the scope of his public employment or duties.”73  Further, the law 
                                                          
69. For a summary of states‟ Good Samaritan laws, see Department of Health & Human Services, Emer-
gency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) – Legal and Regu-
latory Issues, CENTERS FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC‟S HEALTH, 95 (May 2006), at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/ESAR%20VHP%20Report.pdf. 
70. Further, charitable immunity statutes offer an affirmative defense (even outside a state of emergency) 
to a liability action for organizations that derive its funds mainly from public and private charity.  Forty-
three states – not including New York – and the District of Columbia have enacted non-emergent charitable 
immunity legislation, thirty-six of which have legislatively changed the legal standard of care from negli-
gence to gross negligence (or a “willful or wanton” or “reckless” standard).  Paul A. Hattis & Janet Walton, 
Volunteers in Health Care, Understanding Charitable Immunity Legislation (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://www.operationgivingback.facs.org/stuff/contentmgr/files/035c41f19a8dcf8a1e89b218e2d724fb/misc
/vihcharit.imm.man.pdf. 
71. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(1)(a) (McKinney 2012).  See also New York State Dep‟t Health Office of 
Health Emergency Preparedness, Questions and Answers, available at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/funding/rfa/1007161051/questions_and_answers.pdf.  Among others, an em-
ployee can be “any person holding a position by election, appointment or employment in the service of the 
state . . . whether or not compensated, or a volunteer expressly authorized to participate in a state-sponsored 
volunteer program, but shall not include an independent contractor.”  Health care providers employed by 
the state are covered if they are otherwise eligible.  Persons employed by the Roswell Park Cancer Institute 
and engaged in clinical practice pursuant to a clinical practice plan established by the Commissioner of 
Health pursuant to N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 206(14) are covered if they are otherwise eligible. 
72. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 14 (McKinney 2012). 
73. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(2) (McKinney 2012). 
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requires the state to provide indemnity to employees of public state entities 
acting within the scope of public employment or duties unless the damages 
“resulted from intentional wrongdoing.”74  If a judgment is entered against 
such an individual, the state must indemnify and hold harmless him or her 
in the amount of any judgment or settlement.  In these cases, his or her 
primary malpractice insurance would be responsible to pay the judgment, 
and to the extent that one has no insurance or the insurance is exhausted, 
the State would cover the individual for the difference. 
Amendment of Public Officers Law Section 17 to require the defense 
or indemnification of all health care providers in actions arising from their 
adherence to the Guidelines, whether or not employed by the state or par-
ticipating in a state-sponsored volunteer program, might encourage health 
care workers to follow the clinical protocols proposed for ventilator alloca-
tion in an influenza pandemic. 
However, defense or indemnification or both – without immunity – 
may be inadequate to convince health care workers to follow the Ventila-
tor Guidelines.  Health care providers against whom a claim is brought 
would still be required to endure the time and burdens associated with a 
lawsuit.  Likewise, health care providers‟ reputations would suffer because 
identities of providers named in malpractice settlements or payments must 
be reported to a national data bank.75  Moreover, such an expansion of the 
state‟s obligations under Section 17, without any immunity for the newly-
covered defendants, would expose the state to potentially enormous un-
budgeted costs. 
4. Federal and New York State Law Offers Inadequate Liability 
Protections 
In summary, existing liability protections are a patchwork of federal 
and state law, which provides limited immunity from civil liability for vo-
lunteers.  The laws‟ civil indemnity and defense protections are more ex-
tensive than civil immunity protections, and their civil liability protections 
are much more extensive than their criminal liability protections.  Moreo-
ver, liability protections are broader for individuals than for entities. 
New York‟s piecemeal and varied approach to providing liability 
protections for health care providers and entities in a disaster emergency is 
                                                          
74. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(3)(a) (McKinney 2012).  New York City separately indemnifies volunteers 
for noncriminal actions by providing legal representation to caregivers in case of litigation. N.Y. PUB. OFF. 
LAW § 18(1)(b) (McKinney 2012). 
75. Judith C. Ahronheim, Service by Health Care Providers in a Public Health Emergency: The Physi-
cian’s Duty and the Law, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL‟Y 195, 233 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a)-(b) (2006) 
(requiring reports on medical malpractice payments)).  
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inadequate.  The Disaster Act does not immunize private health care 
workers; the Good Samaritan laws do not immunize health care providers 
within hospitals or compensated actors with a prior duty of care to the pa-
tient; and Public Officers Law Section 17 does not provide defense or in-
demnification to those who are not state employees or volunteers expressly 
authorized to participate in a state-sponsored volunteer program.76  In the 
majority of cases, New York State laws will not apply to those who will be 
called upon to provide care pursuant to the Guidelines – those who are pri-
vately employed in a hospital with a preexisting duty of care to patients.77  
Compensated health care providers who continue to perform their profes-
sional responsibilities during a declared emergency constitute “an often 
ignored segment of the responder population.”78  The existing approach to 
                                                          
76. The definition of “volunteer” can influence the extent to which health care workers are protected in a 
declared emergency.  See Evan D. Anderson & James G. Hodge, Emergency Legal Preparedness Among 
Select US Local Governments, 3 (Suppl. 2) DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS S1, S5 (2009) 
(“How localities legally define the term volunteer directly affects the extent to which local governments can 
protect VHPs from liability in declared emergencies”).  Most states‟ – including New York‟s – liability 
protections are limited in scope and coverage, extending protections only to unpaid “volunteers” or state 
actors (who are protected under sovereign immunity laws) and excluding paid health care workers who 
render care under existing employment or as an independent contractor during a health care crisis.  N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3013 (McKinney 2012) provides liability immunity for uncompensated first respond-
ers who render care in an emergency.  See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 28-13 (2010) (conferring immunity 
and Attorney General defense only to volunteer members of specific entities comprised of medical and pub-
lic health volunteers, except in cases of willful misconduct).  Although City of New York ordinances also 
do not define “volunteer,” New York State law defines “city employees” to include volunteers expressly 
authorized to participate in City-sponsored volunteer programs. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 18(1)(b) 
(McKinney 2012).  As noted earlier, the federal VPA offers limited immunity to volunteers who are com-
pensated less than $500 per year who serve nonprofit organizations and government entities in certain cir-
cumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6) (1999).  Likewise, the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practition-
ers Act  (“UEVHPA”), which New York State has not adopted, extends civil liability protections to 
registered health care volunteers similar to the immunity provided to state employees under the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (“EMAC”). Nat‟l Conference of Comm‟rs on Unif. State Law, The Uni-
form Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act, § 2(15) (2006), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uiehsa/2007act_final.pdf.  The UEVHPA defines “volunteer 
health practitioners” to constitute a “health practitioner who provides health or veterinary services, whether 
or not the practitioner receives compensation for those services” except those who “receive[] compensation 
pursuant to a preexisting employment relationship with a host entity or affiliate which requires the practi-
tioner to provide health services in this state.”  Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act 
(UEVHPA): An Overview, CENTERS FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC‟S HEALTH at 2, at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/ESAR%20VHP%20UEVHPA.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 
2013). 
77. See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1917, 1959 (arguing that “exclusion of paid workers and entities from 
immunity protection is imprudent because it creates barriers to effective emergency response initiatives…” 
and “raises important questions of justice,” and recommending legislation ensuring that “health care pro-
viders will not be liable for injuries or harm caused by good-faith actions undertaken in order to respond to 
a public health emergency so long as they are acting in their capacity as employers or employees in the af-
fected area or volunteering under the direction of governmental authorities or nonprofit organizations, and 
are not engaged in willful misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal activity.”). 
78. Id. at 1917.  In contrast, Virginia provides arguably the most extensive immunity protections in the 
United States, including offering protections to health care workers in a declared state of emergency, re-
gardless of pay.  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2011) (“In the absence of gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct, any health care provider who responds to a disaster shall not be liable for any injury or wrongful 
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immunity and indemnity is insufficient to protect those health care work-
ers and entities who “bear the brunt of the burden” in delivering care dur-
ing a disaster emergency.79 
IV. REGULATION OR LEGISLATION? 
Law and regulations, due to their static and binding nature, are not an 
ideal delivery system for clinically-detailed recommendations, particularly 
in rapidly-changing circumstances, such as a pandemic.  Consequently, 
voluntary, non-binding guidelines based on “sound ethical and clinical 
principles” would be the best means of ensuring an effective ventilator al-
location system, while avoiding unforeseen consequences.80  Accordingly, 
New York chose to issue its draft recommendations for ventilator alloca-
tion in the form of guidelines.  However, while guidelines recommending 
modifications to the standards for the normal delivery of care may be op-
timal for purposes of flexibility and tailoring clinical behavior to the pre-
cise nature of the disaster, they afford the least amount of legal protection 
to practitioners because of their non-binding nature. 
If a pandemic were to occur today, health care providers and entities 
in New York would have limited recourse if sued for adhering to the Ven-
tilator Guidelines.  However, proof of compliance with the Guidelines 
might still constitute presumptive (rebuttable) or non-conclusive evidence 
of the legal standard of care – a defense to a claim of negligence.81  Guide-
lines for appropriate treatment protocols during public health emergencies 
                                                                                                                                          
death of any person arising from the delivery or withholding of health care when (i) a state or local emer-
gency has been or is subsequently declared in response to such disaster, and (ii) the emergency and subse-
quent conditions caused a lack of resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the health care provider 
unable to provide the level or manner of care that otherwise would have been required in the absence of the 
emergency and which resulted in the injury or wrongful death at issue.”) (emphasis added).  Commentators 
in other states have advocated for using Virginia‟s legislation as a model for protecting health care provid-
ers who provide care in a crisis. See Stephen P. Williams & Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, Is There Much Li-
mited Legal Liability Protection for Physicians in Crisis Standards of Care in SC? 107 J.S.C. MED. ASSOC. 
96 (2011). 
79. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1918, 1953 (calling existing immunity schemes “piecemeal, incomplete, 
and confusing”). 
80. Ventilator Guidelines, supra note 1, at 3. 
81. Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice and Physician Accountability: Trends in the Courts and 
Legislative Responses, 4 ANN. HEALTH L. 105, 118-120 (1994).  It may be argued that even without an ex-
plicitly delineated crisis standard of care, the existence of a public health emergency may still be considered 
a relevant “circumstance” that the jury could consider in deciding liability. See Department of Health & 
Human Services, Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-
VHP) – Legal and Regulatory Issues, CENTERS FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC‟S HEALTH, at 43, at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/ESAR%20VHP%20Report.pdf (“The circumstances related 
to the emergency as a whole play a factor in establishing the standard of care for the physicians and medical 
staff rendering care.”).  See Williams & Boyd, supra note 78, at 97 (“the accepted consensus by [licensed 
health care professionals] and professional organizations on Pandemic Flu Guidelines (“PFGs”) likely aid 
in successfully defending a medical malpractice lawsuit after the pandemic ends…”). 
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developed by organizations may be “useful in litigation for the purpose of 
determining whether health professionals acted appropriately and are en-
titled to immunity.”82  Thus, the Guidelines may serve as departmentally 
promulgated “soft law,”83 providing strong evidence of an established 
standard of care that could reasonably be expected of health care providers 
in a disaster emergency.84 
Such deference to professional standards of conduct in the form of 
policies, codes, and guidelines is not without precedent.85  For years, tort 
reformers have argued for the use of clinical practice guidelines (“CPGs”) 
as evidence of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.86  In re-
sponse, some states have legislated that guidance developed by expert con-
sensus demonstrate, or are evidence of, the standard of care in civil liabili-
ty cases.87 
                                                          
82. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1962.  Hoffman continues, “[c]onversely, those who deviated from well-
established emergency procedures will be found to have engaged in gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct.” Id. at 1963.  See also ANA Issue Brief: Who Will be There? Ethics, the Law, and a Nurse’s Duty to 
Respond in a Disaster, AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION (2010), available at 
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/WorkplaceSafety/DPR/Disaster-Preparedness.pdf; 
Adapting Standards of Care Under Extreme Conditions: Guidance for Professionals During Disasters, 
Pandemics, and Other Extreme Emergencies, AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION (2008), available at 
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/WorkplaceSafety/DPR/TheLawEthicsofDisasterRespo
nse/AdaptingStandardsofCare.pdf. 
83. Angela Campbell & Kathleen Cranley Glass, The Ethical Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes, 
and Guidelines in Medical Practice in Research, 46 MCGILL L.J. 473 (2001). 
84. Ventilator Guidelines, supra note 1.  See also Institute of Medicine, Guidance for Establishing Crisis 
Standards of Care for Use in Disaster Situations, 49 (2009) (recommending that states “explicitly tie exist-
ing liability protections… for health care practitioners and entities to crisis standards of care.”).  The Venti-
lator Guidelines would also likely be non-conclusive evidence of the standard of care in professional discip-
linary proceedings. 
85. Campbell & Glass, supra note 83, at 476.  See, e.g., Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants PC, 1997 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 597 (1997) (finding that guidelines issued by the American College of Cardiology and the 
American Health Association for interpreting exercise treadmill tests administered to patients, supported by 
expert testimony, represent the standard of care for the profession). 
86. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: the Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 648 (2001) (proposing that “while there may be certain 
efficiencies associated with the use of CPGs as the legal standard of care, their use is deeply problematic” 
due to their permitted use only as exculpatory evidence (by physician defendants) and not as inculpatory 
evidence (by plaintiffs)); Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of 
Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989). The 
Institute of Medicine defines CPGs as “statements that include recommendations intended to optimize pa-
tient care that are informed by a systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms 
of alternative care options.” Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice Guide-
lines, Institute of Medicine, Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust 4 (Robin Graham, Michelle 
Mancher, Dianne Miller Wolman, Sheldon Greenfield, & Earl Steinberg, eds., 2011). 
87. Mello, supra note 86, at 665 (“[t]he prevailing practice is to admit CPGs in connection with expert tes-
timony, but not to give them determinative weight.”).  Mello provides a useful summary of the various pro-
posals for giving guidelines a greater role in negligence litigation, including the “contract model,” the 
“judicial notice model” (which proposes that courts take judicial notice of CPGs as representing the legal 
standard of care), and the “Maine model.”  Id. From 1992 until 1996, a Maine statutory demonstration 
project created an absolute affirmative defense to medical malpractice claims for physicians who demon-
strated compliance with specific practice guidelines. 24 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. §§ 2971-2979 (repealed 
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Likewise, some state courts allow industry codes and standards to be 
admitted in support of a defense to medical malpractice.  Many states, in-
cluding New York, recognize these codes and standards as probative – not 
conclusive – evidence on the issue of the defendant‟s duty.88  New York 
courts have held that, even with evidence that a health care provider com-
plied with state guidelines, there may still be an issue regarding whether 
the proper standard of care has been met.89 
Thus, demonstrating that a health care provider or entity followed the 
Guidelines would only constitute evidence of meeting the standard of care, 
but would not insulate that individual or entity from suit.90  Moreover, al-
though guidelines may be evidence of the standard of care or may serve as 
an affirmative defense in negligence proceedings, courts may be unwilling 
to hold that declining to follow them would amount to gross negligence or 
professional misconduct.91 
                                                                                                                                          
1999). Kentucky‟s statute, which is still in effect, protects physicians who follow CPG protocols that have 
been adopted by the health commissioner. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.035(8) (a)-(b) (West 2010) (“(a) 
…The commissioner may adopt any parameters for clinical practice as developed and updated by the feder-
al Agency for Health Care Policy Research, or the commissioner may adopt other parameters for clinical 
practice which are developed by qualified bodies, as determined by the commissioner, with periodic updat-
ing based on data collected during the application of the parameters. (b) Any provider of medical services 
under this chapter who has followed the practice parameters or guidelines developed or adopted pursuant to 
this subsection shall be presumed to have met the appropriate legal standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases regardless of any unanticipated complication that may thereafter develop or be discovered.”).  Draft 
Massachusetts guidelines also suggest that reliance on guidance will serve as evidence of having met the 
crisis standard of care and state that an individual patient to whom an approved crisis standard of care is 
provided should have no basis to assert in a medical malpractice claim against the health care provider 
that an appropriate level of care was not provided. Levin, supra note 58, at S138 (“Moreover, the [health 
care provider], having met the requisite standard of care, should not be held liable in a malpractice action 
based on the provision of care in accordance with an approved” crisis standard of care). 
88. See Bailey v. Bakers Air Force Gas Corp., 376 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 1975). See also Da-
niel E. Feld, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence, on Issue of Negligence, of Codes or Standards of Safety 
Issued or Sponsored by Governmental Body or by Voluntary Association, 58 A.L.R.3d 148, 155 (1974) 
(summarizing the varying approaches to the admissibility of safety codes or standards). 
89. See Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1967) (holding that 
compliance with federal and state flammability-testing methods was some evidence of due care, but was 
not conclusive). 
90. See also Memorandum from Henry Greenberg to Public Health Council‟s Ad Hoc Committee on Qual-
ity Assurance in Office-Based Surgery, Statutory and Regulatory Authority Over Office-Based Surgery 
(May 11, 1998) (on file with author).  Greenberg further notes that “[w]hile neither strict compliance with, 
nor deviation from, the [office-based surgery] guidelines would be dispositive, the guidelines could be im-
portant as a benchmark for professional practice.”  Id. 
91. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 810 N.E.2d 405 (N.Y. 2004).  The New 
York State Association of Nurse Anesthetists sought a declaration that the Department of Health‟s Clinical 
Guidelines for Office-Based Surgery were null and void because they are, in fact, regulations, promulgated 
outside of the Department‟s authority.  Despite the Supreme Court and Appellate Division both holding that 
the guidelines were regulations and that their promulgation was outside the scope of the Department‟s au-
thority, the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed for lack of standing, without reaching the merits of the 
substantive claim. 
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V. APPROACHES TO MITIGATING CIVIL LIABILITY 
Recognizing the dearth of existing protections for health care provid-
ers and entities that adhere to the Guidelines, there are a number of possi-
ble approaches to providing protections from civil liability.  Legislation 
conferring immunity upon health care providers and entities that provide 
care in a pandemic pursuant to the Guidelines may offer the most protec-
tion, and therefore, be most effective in encouraging compliance with the 
ventilator allocation protocol.  However, various additional options – im-
plemented either alone or in combination with each other – merit consider-
ation as approaches to mitigating civil liability. 
A. Immunity-Conferring Legislation 
Guidelines, such as the Ventilator Allocation Guidelines, recommend 
shifting scarce resources in order to save the most lives possible, rather 
than focusing on the individual.92 It is well understood that the provision 
and scope of care may reasonably change according to the circumstances 
of a disaster.93  However, in an emergency, the declaration of a modified 
medical standard of care may enable health care providers to more easily 
demonstrate that they met the requisite level of care in order to avoid civil 
liability.94  The establishment of immunity-conferring protections for 
                                                          
92. Health Sys. Research, Inc., AHRQ Pub. No. 05-0043, Altered Standards of Care in Mass Casualty 
Events, at 8 (2005), available at http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/altstand.pdf [hereinafter 
“AHRQ”] (the AHRQ‟s Public Health Emergency Preparedness (“PHEP”) program was discontinued on 
June 30, 2011). 
93. See George Annas, Standard of Care – In Sickness and in Health and in Emergencies, 362 NEW ENGL. 
J. MED. 2126 (2010); Mark A. Rothstein, Malpractice Immunity for Volunteer Physicians in Public Health 
Emergencies: Adding Insult to Injury, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 150 (2010) (“[I]n stark contrast to sug-
gestions by some „altered standards of care‟ advocates, the current standard of care applied to all medical 
malpractice cases is sufficiently flexible and situation-specific that it need not be altered”); Hoffman, supra 
note 33; Kristi L. Koenig, et al., Crisis Standards of Care: Refocusing Health Care Goals During Cata-
strophic Disasters and Emergencies, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL MED. 159, 161 (2011) (“Being a 
flexible doctrine, it is the same regardless of the circumstances – understood simply as doing what you can 
under the circumstances, with the patient‟s informed consent”).  But see Darren P. Mareiniss et al., ICU 
Triage: The Potential Legal Liability of Withdrawing ICU Care During a Catastrophic Event, 6 AM. J. 
DISASTER MED. 329 (2011) (arguing that relying on the flexibility of the legal standard of care may be in-
adequate and therefore special immunities and protections may be required). 
94. See, e.g., Brooke Courtney, Emergency Legal Preparedness and the Public’s Health: Five Legal Pre-
paredness Challenges for Responding to Future Public Health Emergencies, 39 J. L. MED. ETHICS 60, 61-
62 (2011); CDC Public Health Law Program, After-Action Report: Legal Issues and the H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, 13 (Apr. 30, 2010), at 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/H1N1/upload/043010-H1N1-Legal-Issues-After-Action-Report.pdf (identify-
ing the “[n]ecessity of term “Crisis” or “Altered” Standards of Care for medical professionals during a pub-
lic health emergency” and the “legal authority for standards of care” as outstanding legal issues to be ad-
dressed); Mareiniss, supra note 93, at 332 (focusing on the flexibility of the legal standard of care because 
informed consent would be violated when providers proceeded with the “unconsented” reallocation of ICU 
resources in a pandemic). 
KOCH_FORMATTED[1] (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2013  7:58 AM 
488 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 14.3:467 
 
health care providers and entities who follow the Guidelines, coupled with 
the declaration of a crisis medical standard of care, would facilitate consis-
tency in application and enable the avoidance of unpredictable outcomes 
when legal disputes occur.95  Thus, official public state acknowledgment of 
a crisis standard of care in an emergency would ensure forethought in de-
cision-making and consistency in the application of the Guidelines, as well 
as ease the burden on health care workers who seek to prove non-negligent 
behavior after the disaster has passed. 
New, clear legislation that provides reduced liability is the most ef-
fective way to protect practitioners who follow the Guidelines.96  Because 
the Guidelines themselves are purely advisory and do not carry the force 
of law,97 legislation could render adherence conclusive (irrebuttable) evi-
dence of compliance with the standard of care, potentially serving as the 
basis for a dismissal of the complaint without trial.  Therefore, this ap-
proach would maintain the voluntary nature of the clinical guidelines in 
combination with the promulgation of immunity-conferring legislation to 
protect health care workers and entities.98 
Legislation extending liability protections should include limitations 
like a good faith requirement and exclusions for certain acts of gross neg-
                                                          
95. Levin, supra note 58, at S133 (describing altered standards of care as “standards that are acceptable 
when adequate resources are not available to meet the usual standard of care” furnished by health care pro-
viders).  See also Brooke Courtney & James G. Hodge, Legal Considerations During Pediatric Emergency 
Mass Critical Care Events, 12 PEDIATR. CRIT. CARE MED. S152, S154 (2011). 
96. For an example of extensive immunity protections for care provided in an emergency, see VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2011) (“In the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, any health care pro-
vider who responds to a disaster shall not be liable for any injury or wrongful death of any person arising 
from the delivery or withholding of health care when . . . the emergency and subsequent conditions caused 
a lack of resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the health care provider unable to provide the lev-
el or manner of care that otherwise would have been required in the absence of the emergency and which 
resulted in the injury or wrongful death at issue.”) (emphasis added). Virginia‟s law was crafted to establish 
a crisis standard of care and confer immunity on health care providers based on this standard. 
97. “If there were to be fixed standards in regulations for physician [private practice], there would need to 
be some enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure compliance.”  Greenberg, Statutory and Regulatory 
Authority Over Office-Based Surgery, supra note 90.  Thus, if Department-issued guidelines were to 
amount to a “fixed, general principle,” they would be considered improperly promulgated regulations be-
cause the New York State Department of Health does not generally have authority to regulate the practice 
of medicine, regardless of what they are called.  N.Y. State Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 753 
N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2003).  In Novello, the Appellate Division noted that the Department of 
Health had intended its office based surgery guidelines to “represent uniform professional standards of 
care and may help to clarify a practitioner‟s obligations under law and regulation.”  Based on this fact, the 
court concluded, “[i]n our view, on its face this assertion suggests that the Guidelines, however self-named 
or characterized, are regulations.” Id. 
98. Ventilator Guidelines, supra note 1 (“The combination of voluntary guidelines based on sound ethical 
and clinical principles, paired with legislation that protects providers who comply with the guidelines, of-
fers the best possible balance of clarity, flexibility, and confidence in designing public health policy for 
allocating ventilators in a pandemic”).  For examples of the most broad immunity-conferring legislation 
currently in effect, see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2008); MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. § 14-3A-06 
(2004).  
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ligence or willful misconduct.99  However, arguably, immunity-conferring 
statutes that exempt “willful misconduct” may not adequately protect 
health care providers who remove ventilator therapy from a patient consis-
tent with state-promulgated guidelines.  Such an act might be considered 
to be willful or in conscious disregard of the safety of the individual 
harmed and therefore beyond the protective scope of the law.100  Thus, 
special consideration should be given to ensure that any immunity-
conferring legislation does not limit the ability for any individual or hos-
pital to withdraw certain medical equipment pursuant to the Guidelines. 
However, such legislation may be practically and politically difficult 
to realize, particularly without identification of the scope of behavior that 
it is intended to protect.  Moreover, it would not insulate health care work-
ers from liability for breaches of federal law or federal constitutional 
claims alleging violations of due process, equal protection, or takings law. 
B. Caps on Damages 
Legislation imposing a cap on damages in liability cases arising out 
of declared emergencies (or for those who, in particular, abide by the 
Guidelines) could offer some protections for health care workers, thereby 
encouraging adherence to the Guidelines.  Commentators have noted that 
damages caps “have been found to generate small increases in the supply 
of physicians,” which demonstrates that “diminished concerns about liabil-
ity are associated with greater willingness on the part of individuals to 
serve as health care providers.”101  Many states have already instituted 
damages caps in liability cases arising out of malpractice claims general-
ly.102  However, some states – but not New York – have found caps on 
noneconomic damages to be unconstitutional.103  The subject of damages 
                                                          
99. In most states that confer liability protections in an emergency, their laws shield health care workers 
from negligence liability, but not gross negligence.  But see Mareiniss, supra note 93, at 333 (noting that 
Black‟s Law Dictionary “defines willful, reckless, wanton, and gross negligence as acts that are intentional-
ly done despite the known risk that it is „highly probable that harm will follow‟”). 
100. Mareiniss, supra note 93, at 333. 
101. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1956. 
102. As of 2010, twenty-eight states had laws limiting damages in malpractice cases.  Medical Liabili-
ty/Malpractice Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18516. See, e.g., FL. STAT. § 766.118 (2011) (noneconomic dam-
ages limited to $500,000 per claimant); S.C. CODE § 15-32-220(a) (2010) (noneconomic damages limited 
to $350,000 against single health care provider or facility); BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (2011) (a 
health care provider is not liable for an amount in excess of $250,000 for an occurrence of malpractice); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(a) (2010) ($500,000 maximum non-economic per plaintiff; the state also 
has caps for liability in providing emergency care, also often barred from bringing claims of negligence; 
only gross negligence).  See also Fred J. Hellinger & William E. Encinosa, The Impact of State Laws Limit-
ing Malpractice Damage Awards on Health Care Expenditures, 96 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1375 (2006). 
103. See, e.g., Brannigan v. Usitalso, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (finding that the $875,000 cap on non-
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caps in New York has been the subject of much debate, although the state 
currently has no applicable statute imposing any damage award limits or 
caps in tort suits.104  Nevertheless, despite the resistance to damages caps 
for medical malpractice cases arising out of routine care, it may be more 
palatable to institute them for care provided in emergency situations. 
C. Expedited Discovery and Statutes of Limitations 
Under existing law, it is within the discretion of the court to set the 
schedule for discovery.105  In order to ease the burden on individuals and 
entities who comply with the Ventilator Guidelines, courts could expedite 
the initial phase of discovery in tort suits arising out of circumstances re-
lated to a public health disaster and limit discovery to the production of 
evidence that the Guidelines were followed.106  New legislation could re-
quire New York State courts to exercise their power to order discovery to 
take place in stages, limiting initial discovery to the issue of compliance 
with the standard of care applicable in a disaster emergency where the 
Guidelines were followed.  The health care provider or entity defendant 
could then move for summary judgment or dismissal before being required 
to undergo further discovery on additional issues. 
Instead of requiring that discovery occur in stages, courts could alter-
natively limit discovery in tort claims arising from a state of declared 
                                                                                                                                          
economic damages violated the equal protection provision of the state constitution); Ferdon v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (finding that a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medi-
cal malpractice cases violates the state‟s equal protection guarantee).  But see Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 
(Alas. 2002) (finding that the cap did not limit access to the courts, did not infringe on the right to a trial by 
jury, and did not deny substantive due process, constitute a denial of equal protection, or violate the separa-
tion of powers); Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.M. 2002) (holding that the cap was 
not arbitrary and capricious in limiting deserving plaintiffs from deserved relief, and that was rationally 
related to the legislative goal of ensuring a source of recovery for victims of medical malpractice and curb-
ing runaway costs of health care). 
104. New York allows punitive damages without limitation for tort actions. See Pearlman v. Friedman 
Alpren & Green LLP, 750 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2002) (allowing punitive damages for inten-
tional or deliberate wrongdoing, aggravating or outrageous circumstances, fraudulent or evil motive, or 
conscious act in willful and wanton disregard of another‟s rights). However, the Appellate Division has a 
statutory responsibility to reduce excessive damages awards, which is often exercised in medical malprac-
tice cases.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 2012) (“In reviewing a money judgment in an action in 
which an itemized verdict is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven of this chapter in which it is con-
tended that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have been granted unless a sti-
pulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or 
inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation”). 
105. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3406 (McKinney 2012). 
106. The cases disputing the contours of Governor Pataki‟s Section 30.30 suspension in response to Sep-
tember 11th give rise to a consideration of what is within the Governor‟s authority in suspending or mod-
ifying certain civil and criminal trial rules.  It would seem that changing the discovery rules to streamline or 
eliminate certain burdens may not always be an available approach.  However, extending the discovery 
period to allow for delays due to a declared emergency may be within the governor‟s authority. 
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emergency.  In most state and federal courts, the discovery rules are based 
on the rules of evidence, which often require a basic balancing test to de-
termine whether discovery may be limited.107  New York civil practice law 
and rules require “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in 
the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of 
proof.”108 
Alternatively, the statute of limitations for instituting legal action for 
negligence claims arising out of care rendered during a declared health 
emergency may be shortened.  In New York, the existing statute of limita-
tions for instituting a medical malpractice claim, regardless of the circums-
tances out of which the claim arises, is 2.5 years.109  Shortening this time 
period for actions arising out of an emergency may lessen the number of 
health care providers who must defend against a lawsuit. 
Thus, although modification of the discovery process and statutes of 
limitation would provide neither immunity nor indemnity to health care 
providers and entities, it might lessen the time and resources they expend 
when defending a suit by diminishing the likelihood of suit, shortening the 
length of the process, and permitting the dismissal of time-barred actions. 
D. Alternative Resolution Procedures 
The use of alternative dispute resolution procedures and the estab-
lishment of substituted methods of handling civil liability suits that might 
arise from adhering to the Ventilator Guidelines could also ease the poten-
tial burdens of litigation on both health care providers and the court sys-
                                                          
107. In the context of electronically stored information (“ESI”), for example, under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the trial court has the power to limit discovery “if the burden or expense of the pro-
posed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26.  New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
have not been modified as the Federal Rules have to address the balancing of burden versus benefit.  The 
Joint Committee has proposed that the advisory notes to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3103 (McKinney 2012) be 
amended to include the same language as FED. R. CIV. P. 26.  The new language would allow a New York 
court dealing with an ESI discovery dispute to consider “whether the burden or expense of the pro-
posed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
the parties‟ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of 
the discovery in resolving those issues.” Norman C. Simon et al., Amending the CPLR to Reflect Changes 
to the Information Landscape: the Association of the Bar of the City of New York’s Proposals (Jan. 4, 
2010), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fbe599b7-5d10-4243-b8ef-
dd92a7d4b8f9.   As noted elsewhere, the New York State legislature has no power to govern federal deci-
sions. 
108. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(a) (McKinney 2012).  However, a search of case law did not identify any in-
stances where discovery rules were altered for particular fact patterns. 
109. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(a) (McKinney 2012) (“An action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice 
must be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last 
treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to 
the said act, omission or failure.”).  Lawsuits based on intentional torts, such as battery, have a statute of 
limitations of one year.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (McKinney 2012). 
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tem.  Claims related to health care provided during an emergency could 
be: (1) settled by arbitration; (2) subject to pretrial review panels; or (3) 
ameliorated by covering injuries with monies gathered in a compensation 
pool in lieu of instituting suit.  Each approach has advantages and limita-
tions. 
1. Arbitration 
Arbitration is generally less expensive, time-consuming, and burden-
some than litigation, although there is conflicting evidence regarding 
whether arbitration leads to more frequent findings of liability and higher 
damages awards than litigation.110  Arbitration may not lead to fewer pro-
plaintiff judgments or lower damages, but there is reason to believe that it 
would decrease transaction costs and certain burdens associated with liti-
gation, particularly those associated with longer discovery periods.111 
Although no state has yet adopted an arbitration board to review cas-
es arising out of pandemics or other emergencies,112 New York could legis-
latively require cases arising out of circumstances associated with a de-
clared disaster emergency to be subject to binding arbitration.  
Importantly, however, courts have noted the crucial distinction between 
voluntary and compulsory arbitration, the latter of which is particularly 
subject to constitutional attacks.  Although compulsory binding arbitration 
is not per se unconstitutional,113 in some cases it may violate the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial114 and/or impinge on due process guaran-
                                                          
110. Compare David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consum-
er Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 33 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60-61 (1997) (arguing that cor-
porate defendants prefer arbitration because, among other things, it generally yields lower damage awards, 
reduces defense costs, and eliminates pretrial discovery) with Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Ad-
hesive Arbitration Agreements - With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. 
AM. ARB. 251, 261 (2006) (noting that small meritorious claims, some of which might not be cost effective 
in litigation, may see higher awards in arbitration).  
111. Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waiver or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. 
LEG. STUD. 1 (1995). However, some research has found that arbitration does not lower transaction costs. 
See Public Citizen, Cost of Arbitration: Executive Summary, LAW MEMO: FIRST IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(May 1, 2002), available at http://www.lawmemo.com/arb/res/cost.htm. 
112. Kristine M. Gebbie et al., Adapting Standards of Care Under Extreme Conditions, 3 DISASTER MED. 
& PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 111, 115 (2009). 
113. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. 
Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1984); Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 734 F. Supp. 
86 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding lemon law constitutional because arbitrators were independent and impartial-
ly chosen, and arbitration hearings were governed by a myriad of procedural safeguards). 
114. Although the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury only applies to federal cases, the New York 
State Constitution also provides for a right to trial by jury.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved 
. . . .”); N.Y.  CONST. art. I § 1 (“No member of this state shall be . . . deprived of any . . . rights or privileg-
es . . . unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his or her peers . . . .”).  Additionally, a case brought 
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tees.115  Commentators have noted that “the paucity of decisions” regard-
ing the legality of compulsory arbitration “in cases involving such statutes 
bars the formulation of any general rule as to their constitutionality.”116 
New York courts have found that compulsory binding arbitration is 
constitutional, but the arbitrator‟s determination must be subject to “closer 
judicial scrutiny”than for determinations made in voluntary arbitration.117  
For example, courts have held that the legislature can, in the interest of 
public health and welfare,requirethe settlement of labor disputes in non-
profit hospitals through compulsory and binding arbitration, provided there 
is substantive and procedural due process of law.118  Courts have also held 
that New York‟s new car “lemon law,” which establishes a compulsory 
arbitration process, satisfies the minimal requirements of due process, be-
cause litigants are entitled to receive judicial review under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard enunciated in New York civil procedural rules.119 
The easiest way to avoid constitutional attacks would be to allow on-
                                                                                                                                          
in or removed to federal court may require a jury trial pursuant to the Seventh Amendment even if the un-
derlying cause of action sounds in state law.  Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (finding “that the 
right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity . . . ac-
tions.  The federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength.”). See also Henry Cohen 
& Vanessa Burrows, Congressional Research Service Report 95-797, Federal Tort Reform Legislation: 
Constitutionality and Summaries of Selected Statutes (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/95-
797_20080929.pdf. 
115. The due process guarantees of the United States Constitution apply at both the federal and state levels.  
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall… be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”); id. at amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law . . . .”). 
116. R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes, 55 A.L.R.2d 432 (2009).  The labor 
disputes at issue are often ones deciding that such requirements be applicable only to labor disputes af-
fected with a real public interest and they meet the tests traditionally applied to administrative regulation 
and determination of private rights and duties. 
117. See Mount St. Mary’s Hosp. of Niagara Falls v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 500 (1970) (“At the 
inception it should be observed that the essence of arbitration, as traditionally used and understood, is that it 
be voluntary and on consent. The introduction of compulsion to submit to this informal tribunal is to 
change its essence . . .  It is very easy to transfer, quite fallaciously, notions and principles applicable to 
voluntary arbitration to „compulsory‟ arbitration, because, by doubtful logic but irresistible usage, both sys-
tems carry the descriptive noun „arbitration‟ in their names. The simple and ineradicable fact is that volun-
tary arbitration and compulsory arbitration are fundamentally different if only because one may, under our 
system, consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of right, but similar restrictions or depriva-
tions, if compelled by government, must accord with procedural and substantive due process”); In re Pro-
gressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.Y. State Ins. Fund, 47 850 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 2nd Dep‟t 2008). 
118. Requiring compulsory arbitration of malpractice cases arising from circumstances of a disaster emer-
gency would also require appropriate checks on the amount of damages that could be awarded so as not to 
exceed the authority conferred upon the legislature by the state constitution.  Mount St. Mary’s Hosp. of 
Niagara Falls, 26 N.Y.2d at 493 (finding due process requirements had been satisfied because the decision 
was reviewable if the arbitrator acted beyond his authority); In re Long Island Coll. Hosp. v. Catherwood, 
283 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Spec. Term 1967), judgment aff’d, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1967), 
judgment aff’d as modified on other grounds, 287 N.Y.S.2d 313 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1968), order rev’d on 
other grounds, 23 N.Y.2d 20 (1968).  See also City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19 (1975); City of 
Buffalo v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp. Rel. Bd., 363 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
119. Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891, 895-896 (2d Cir. 1991).  
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ly voluntary arbitration (thereby avoiding the jury trial issue) with review 
de novo in the courts (thereby avoiding the due process issue).120  Howev-
er, this would obviate the advantages of binding arbitration, as any fru-
strated party could appeal the decision.  In order to preserve the benefits of 
arbitration, it is important that it be considered “binding” so that the ability 
to challenge the decision is limited.121 
2. Pretrial Review Panels 
Legislation requiring that claims be reviewed by a panel for merit be-
fore they are allowed to proceed to litigation is an alternative similar to 
nonbinding arbitration.  Many (if not most) states require a medical review 
panel determination before the parties can proceed to trial in a medical 
malpractice case.  For example, in Indiana, unless the claimant seeks dam-
ages below $15,000, an action against a health care provider may not be 
commenced before the claimant‟s proposed complaint has been presented 
to a medical review panel and that panel has issued an opinion.122  Ne-
braska requires that medical review panels review all malpractice claims 
against health care providers covered by the Nebraska Hospital-Medical 
Liability Act in advance of filing a civil action.123  The claimant may af-
firmatively waive his or her right to a panel review, and in such case the 
claimant may proceed to file his or her action directly in court.124  New 
York, in contrast, has no pretrial screening procedure. 
                                                          
120. Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes, 55 A.L.R.2d 432 § 2[b] (2009); Carol A. Crocca, Annota-
tion, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 24 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994).  Other states allow malpractice 
suits to be determined by nonbinding arbitration.  For example, Florida allows either party to a medical 
malpractice suit to request that the case be submitted to nonbinding arbitration.  FL. STAT. § 766.107 
(2011).  After the arbitration decision is made, any party may demand a trial de novo in the circuit court, 
where evidence of the arbitration proceeding is not admitted. 
121. New York State already allows parties to enter voluntary binding arbitration in lieu of litigation.  For 
example, in medical malpractice cases it is not required. Where arbitration is elected, the same standard of 
care applies as in a comparable malpractice action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7552(b) (McKinney 2012).  A decision 
of a panel of arbitrators is binding on all parties, unless modified or vacated pursuant to § 7509 or § 7511.  
New York law also expressly authorizes health maintenance organizations (defined broadly) to agree in 
writing with their members prior to treatment that all medical malpractice claims will be subject to binding 
arbitration.  Members must be permitted to opt out. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a (McKinney 2012).  
Where liability is conceded, either party may request arbitration on the amount of damages. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§ 3045 (McKinney 2011). New York C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(iii) (McKinney 2012) authorizes judicial vaca-
tur of arbitration awards where the arbitrator has exceeded his power. 
122. BURNS IND. CODE § 34-18-8-4 et seq. (2011). 
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840 et seq. (2010). 
124. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2843.  “The panel shall, within 30 days, render one or more of the following 
expert opinions which shall be in writing and mailed to each of the parties: (a) The evidence supports the 
conclusion that the defendant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the com-
plaint in specified particulars; (b) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant involved met the 
applicable standard of care required under the circumstances; or (c) There is a material issue of fact, not 
requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury in specified particulars.” 
KOCH_FORMATTED[1] (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2013  7:58 AM 
2013] VENTILATOR ALLOCATION GUIDELINES 495 
 
Pretrial screening panels could serve as a filter, reviewing claims be-
fore a suit is filed and permitting only meritorious claims to proceed to lit-
igation.  The establishment of a special panel, particularly if comprised of 
individuals familiar with disaster medicine protocols and New York‟s 
Ventilator Guidelines, might serve as an effective screening mechanism 
which could potentially ease the burden on health care workers who render 
care pursuant to the Guidelines in a flu pandemic.  However, the use of re-
view boards would require convening a group of specialized volunteers 
willing to review a potentially large number of cases and identifying where 
funding will come to hire and pay reviewers. 
3. Compensation Pools 
Establishment of a non-judicial compensation pool for use as a no-
fault method of claim settlement might decrease the likelihood of litigation 
and lessen the burden on potential litigants.125  Individuals injured due to a 
health care provider‟s or entity‟s adherence to the Guidelines would seek 
redress through the fund in lieu of bringing suit. 
The effective use of both federal and other states‟ compensation 
pools might serve as a model for one in New York State.  For example, the 
PREP Act provides for the establishment of an emergency fund designed 
to compensate aggrieved individuals for certain injuries associated with 
the “covered countermeasures” addressed in the statute.126  An aggrieved 
individual can either “accept the compensation or. . . bring an action un-
der” the PREP Act, but cannot do both.  Similarly, other federal compen-
sation programs have been established to immunize private parties, while 
eliminating the claimant‟s right to sue.  The 1986 National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act established that claims for injuries are first decided by 
the “Vaccine Court” (the Court of Federal Claims).127  The statute prohibits 
suits under state tort law against manufacturers and administrators of spe-
cified vaccines unless the claimant first files a claim for limited no-fault 
compensation (e.g., a $250,000 cap on pain and suffering)  with the Na-
tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which is administered by a 
director selected by the Secretary of HHS.  Claims are paid by the Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Trust Fund, which is funded by a tax on vaccines.  
                                                          
125. See, e.g., James G. Hodge et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity Through the Use 
of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. 
L. & POL‟Y 5, 68 (2005). 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6c(a) (2004); Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1945.  The PREP Act created a new sec-
tion (319F-4) of the Public Health Service Act, which would establish in the Treasury the “Covered Coun-
termeasure Process Fund.” 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c) (1987). 
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However, the statute does not bar all suits; a claimant dissatisfied with the 
outcome may then sue under state tort law.  Likewise, the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 established no-fault compensation for 
injuries sustained in that disaster.128 
Various states have also utilized no-fault compensation funds to de-
crease the administrative costs and burdens of litigation, particularly for 
medical tort cases.129  For example, both Virginia and Florida have estab-
lished compensation programs to pay for the care of infants born with cer-
tain neurological injuries (which are often the most expensive cases).130  
Virginia‟s Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program 
(“NICP”) is funded by hospitals, physicians, and liability insurers who 
choose to participate in the program; no state funds are used.131  Awards 
issued under the NICP are the exclusive remedy for families, meaning that 
if an injury is covered by the NICP, the family is not entitled to compensa-
tion from other legal action.132  Likewise, compensation for injuries under 
Florida‟s Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association 
(“NICA”) is the exclusive remedy, except for cases involving malicious or 
purposefully negligent actions.133  The sources of funds for the pool in-
clude participating obstetricians, all other Florida physicians (who pay a 
lower rate than obstetricians), nonpublic hospitals, and the state of Flori-
da.134 
New York State could set up a compensation pool similar to the fed-
eral and state funds described above for injuries arising out of adherence to 
the Ventilator Guidelines during a declared state of disaster emergency.135  
                                                          
128. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000). The Social Security disability insurance or workers‟ compensation insur-
ance could also be used as a model for such a compensation system. 
129. For an evaluation of no-fault compensation systems for medical injury, see David M. Studdert et al., 
No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217 (2001). 
130. In 2011, the New York Birth-Related Neurological Impairment Compensation Act was introduced in 
New York.  See S. A2814, 2011 Assemb., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (proposing the enactment of the New 
York birth-related neurological injury compensation act; directing the workers‟ compensation board to de-
termine all claims for compensation for birth-related impairment, and if the injury falls within the defined 
scope of neurological injuries, direct compensation by the fund, similar to a no-fault system).  Similar bills 
have been introduced every year since 2001. 
131. Why the Birth-Injury Program, VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION 
PROGRAM, at http://www.vabirthinjury.com/why-the-birth-injury-program/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
132. Id. 
133. THE FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM, at  
http://www.nica.com/what-is-nica.html/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (“NICA ensures that birth-injured infants 
receive the care they need while reducing the financial burden on medical providers and families.”). 
134. For an early evaluation of Florida‟s program, see Jill Horwitz & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Com-
pensation for Medical Injury: A Case Study, 14 HEALTH AFF. 164 (1995), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/14/4/164.full.pdf. 
135. Hodge, supra note 125, at 68.  See also Rothstein, supra note 93, at 152 (noting that “the terms of its 
implementation would have to be carefully designed.”). 
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However, claimants seeking larger payouts might still choose to pursue lit-
igation unless compensation pools were made the exclusive remedy.  
Moreover, it has been argued that creation of such a fund in the (very like-
ly) instance of scarce resources in a pandemic could divert money and per-
sonnel from “providing care and conducting rescue, recovery, and rebuild-
ing operations.”136  Nor is it clear how such a fund would be sustained. 
E. Judge, Court, and Attorney Education 
Although the New York Department of Health may intend for the 
Guidelines to establish the medical standard of care in a pandemic emer-
gency, courts will not necessarily agree.137  Thus, special education, via 
Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) and Continuing Judicial Education 
(“CJE”), for judges, attorneys, and others who participate in the legal sys-
tem may be necessary.  Educating these professionals about the laws, 
guidelines, and policies that pertain to the provision of care in a declared 
emergency may better prepare them to consider and argue for crisis stan-
dards of care, provide tailored jury instructions and charges regarding ap-
propriate conduct in an emergency, and perhaps reduce the liability risk to 
health care workers who provide care pursuant to the Guidelines. 
New York State has already taken a step in this direction: a February 
2010 New York State Bar Association CLE publication provides guidance 
for managing future public health disasters.138  A number of other states 
have also published “bench books” – compilations of materials for use by 
courts in the wake of pandemic influenza – to educate court employees 
(and specifically, judges) on resolving disputes that arise in a public health 
emergency, particularly with regard to issues regarding isolation and qua-
                                                          
136. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1968. 
137. New York common law allows for the consideration of the reasonableness of an individual‟s conduct 
when confronted with a sudden emergency situation.  The common law emergency doctrine “recognizes 
that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for 
thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must 
make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if 
the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context.” Rivera v. N.Y. City Tr. Auth., 77 
N.Y.2d 322, 327 (1991).  In such cases, the judge may provide special instructions to the jury that it may 
consider the reasonableness of a party‟s conduct in light of the unexpected emergency confronting that per-
son.  However, it should be noted that this doctrine has been “somewhat eroded by the evolution from con-
tributory negligence to comparative negligence” in New York courts.  Id. at 335. 
138. New York State Public Health Legal Manual: A Guide for Judges, Attorneys and Public Health Pro-
fessionals (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/PublicHealthLegalManual.pdf. 
The Manual was prepared in collaboration with the New York State Unified Court System, the New York 
State Bar Association, the New York State Department of Health, and the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene. In the section entitled “Allocation of Resources in Disaster,” the authors note 
that there are “[n]o applicable statutes or rules,” but discusses the SDEA, Executive Law (including the 
Disaster Act), the federal PREP Act, and the federal VPA, in the Manual‟s consideration of statutory im-
munity from liability. Id. at 54-55. 
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rantine and determination of jurisdiction and venue.139  Although most of 
these bench books do not address crisis standards of care, specific jury in-
structions, or other issues relevant to the allocation of scarce resources 
during a pandemic, they do provide a model for educating court employees 
for dealing with difficult emergency situations.140  Similarly, attorney edu-
cation about the standard of care in a disaster emergency for providers and 
entities who follow the Guidelines would prepare hospital and physician 
insurance carrier attorneys, health care provider defense attorneys, and 
others to argue to judges and juries about the proper legal standard of care 
in the context of cases as they arise. 
VI. CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Recent events have underscored the need for systematic protection of 
health care providers and entities who follow a modified medical standard 
of care in a public health emergency.  An oft-cited case illustrates the sig-
nificance of providing criminal protections for health care workers who 
render care in a declared emergency.  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
Dr. Anna Maria Pou was arrested for the alleged murder of four elderly 
patients for whom she had provided palliative care at New Orleans‟ Me-
morial Medical Center, providing them with allegedly lethal dosages of 
                                                          
139. See, e.g., Florida Court Education Council, Pandemic Influenza Benchguide: Legal Issues Concerning 
Quarantine and Isolation, FLORIDA STATE COURTS (2007), at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/ 
courted/bin/pandemic_benchguide.pdf; Judicial Council of Georgia, Georgia Pandemic Influenza Bench 
Guide 2009, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, at  
http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/PandemicBenchGuideV1.pdf;  Isolation and Quarantine Benchbook, 
MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH (Nov. 2008), at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/ 
Isolation_and_Quarantine/Isolation_and_Quarantine_Benchbook.pdf; North Carolina Administrative Of-
fice of the Courts, Pandemic Emergency Bench Book for Trial Judges, UNC SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 
(Aug. 2009), at  
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/PandemicEmergencyBenchBook_Dec2009.pdf; Judge 
Robert P. Ringland, Public Health Preparedness Bench Book: A Guide for the Ohio Judiciary & Bar on 
Legal Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies & Routine Health Cases, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/courtSecurity/PandemicPrepareGuide.pdf; Supreme Court of 
Virginia‟s Pandemic Flu Preparedness Commission, Pandemic Influenza Bench Book for Virginia’s Court 
System, VIRGINIA‟S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2010), at  
http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/pfp/benchbook.pdf. 
140. Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, and Michigan are the only bench books that address immunity for res-
ponding in an emergency.  See Daniel S. Strouse, Public Health Law Judicial Reference Guide for Arizona 
Courts, ARIZONA JUDICIAL BRANCH (2006) at  
http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/84/MeetingMaterials/2006/06Dec/publichealthlaw.pdf; Michigan Office of 
the Attorney General, Public Health Law Bench Book for Michigan Courts (2007), at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/Michigan_Public_Health_Bench_Book_221936_7.pdf; Center for 
Public Health Law Partnerships, University of Louisville, Public Health Law Bench Book for Kentucky 
Courts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2006), at http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/6815/; 
Center for Public Health Law Partnerships Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, University of 
Louisville School of Medicine, Public Health Law Bench Book for Indiana Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE COURTS (2005), available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/r_p_docs/INBenchBook.pdf. 
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morphine and midazolam so that they would not suffer pain.141  Although 
the grand jury declined to indict her on the murder counts, the threat of 
criminal liability will likely discourage other physicians, nurses, and health 
care professionals from deviating from standard non-emergency medical 
practice, even if done pursuant to state guidance, in a future emergency. 
Because criminal liability must be proved “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” the standard for finding a health care provider guilty of criminal 
behavior is quite high.142  Regardless, this high burden of proof does not 
shield health care workers from prosecution.  Thus, complying with the 
Guidelines in a severe pandemic could give rise to criminal liability claims 
by patients (or their families), particularly where health care workers with-
held access to ventilators or extubated patients.143  Although legislative ac-
tion could protect health care providers from criminal liability where they 
have appropriately followed the Guidelines, instituting protections for 
health care providers from criminal liability could be even more difficult 
than establishing broader civil liability protections, due to concerns about 
inadvertently sheltering intentional misconduct. 
Currently, no New York law provides criminal immunity to health 
care providers in a state of emergency.144  In fact, only a handful of states 
provide criminal liability protections to health care providers during a dis-
aster.145 
Although New York law does not confer immunity to providers and 
entities who provide care during a declared disaster emergency, New York 
State Public Officers Law Section 19 authorizes reimbursement for crimi-
nal defense expenses incurred by an “employee” – defined similarly to 
Section 17, although without the extension of Section 14 – in his or her de-
fense of a criminal proceeding “arising out of any act which occurred 
while such employee was acting within the scope of his public employ-
ment or duties upon his acquittal or upon the dismissal of the criminal 
                                                          
141. Susan Okie, Dr. Pou and the Hurricane – Implications for Patient Care During Disasters, 358 NEW 
ENGL. J. MED. 1 (2008), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0707917. 
142. See Gina Castellano, Note, The Criminalization of Treating End of Life Patients with Risky Pain Me-
dication and the Role of the Extreme Emergency Situation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 206 (2007). 
143. See, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Forced Abandonment and Euthanasia: A Question from Katrina, 74 SOC. 
RES. 79 (2007). 
144. See Thaddeus Mason Pope & Mitchell F. Palazzo, Legal Briefing: Crisis Standards of Care and Legal 
Protections During Disasters and Emergencies, 21 J. CLIN. ETHICS 358-368, 362 (2010). 
145. See, e.g., MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. § 14-3A-06 (2011) (“A health care provider is immune from 
civil or criminal liability if the health care provider acts in good faith and under a catastrophic health emer-
gency proclamation.”) (emphasis added). See also American College of Emergency Physicians, The Na-
tional Report Card on the State of Emergency Medicine, http://www.emreportcard.org (last visited Feb. 12, 
2013) (noting also that “New York has failed to enact reforms such as pretrial screening panels, a medical 
liability cap on non-economic damages, and expert witness rules that require the witness to be of the same 
specialty as the defendant, among others”). 
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charges against him.”146  The attorney general is empowered to determine, 
after investigation and review of the facts and circumstances of the crimi-
nal proceeding, whether the application for reimbursement should be 
granted.  Thus, Section 19 is less extensive than Section 17, both in the 
protections it offers and who it protects.  Further, as with Section 17, Sec-
tion 19 may be inadequate to convince health care workers to follow the 
Ventilator Guidelines because it would not eliminate the burdens of a law-
suit. 
It has been suggested that guidance from organizations (or, in this 
case, the Task Force and New York Department of Health) could be useful 
in criminal litigation for determining whether health care providers acted 
appropriately.147  However, evidence of reliance on the Guidelines would 
only serve as exculpatory evidence and therefore would not insulate a 
health care provider from criminal prosecution.   
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION 
Legislation granting at least civil (if not also criminal) liability pro-
tections to all health care workers and entities who follow New York 
State‟s Ventilator Guidelines in an influenza pandemic would provide the 
greatest assurance against liability and eliminate the patchwork approach 
to liability protections currently in effect.  The establishment of binding 
immunity-conferring rules would go a long way toward encouraging phy-
sicians, nurses, and other health care workers, as well as hospitals and oth-
er health care entities, to comply with the Guidelines.148 
Any legislation granting immunity to health care providers and enti-
ties that adhere to the Ventilator Guidelines should strike a balance be-
tween safeguarding patients and protecting all health care workers and ent-
ities.  In particular, it should give special consideration to limitations such 
as good faith requirements and exclusions for certain acts of gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct.  Further, any legislation should eliminate the 
line between compensated employees, independent contractors, and unpaid 
or paid volunteers and should apply to all situations in which caregivers 
                                                          
146. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 19 (McKinney 2012). 
147. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1962. 
148. An underlying statutory or regulatory basis must be established for enforcement or mandated com-
pliance – guidelines alone are insufficient.  Greenberg, Statutory and Regulatory Authority Over Office-
Based Surgery, supra note 90.  Notably, Greenberg states that “[d]eviation from the guidelines, however, 
does not necessarily create a prima facie case of negligence.  Any such initiative in New York would re-
quire statutory authority.”  Id. Consequently, an attempt by the Department of Health to condition a deter-
mination of negligence or gross negligence on following the draft guidelines, absent legislation authorizing 
such an action, would be subject to legal challenge.  Id. 
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adhere to the Guidelines, regardless of the setting.149  Finally, liability pro-
tections should not be limited to only those health care workers who fol-
low the clinical protocol presented in the Guidelines; protection should be 
extended to all those who provide, in good faith and in the absence of 
gross negligence, care in a disaster emergency.150 
In the absence of legislation conferring full immunity, states should 
in the least consider the alternative approaches discussed in Section V to 
mitigate costs and burdens of lawsuits. While these protections are certain-
ly less comprehensive than immunity-conferring legislation, they may be 
more politically palatable, and would have substantial impact on encourag-
ing clinicians to adhere to triage protocols necessary to promote survival 
of the greatest number of people during a pandemic. Although the discus-
sion in this article focused primarily on New York State law and policy, its 
analysis and recommendations may be extrapolated to other states and ju-
risdictions, in an effort to encourage compliance with local, state, and fed-
eral disaster plans and guidance. 
 
                                                          
149. This may also obviate Mark Rothstein‟s concern that immunizing only volunteers would create a dis-
tinction between (wealthy) patients of non-volunteer physicians and (indigent) patients of volunteer physi-
cians in their access to legal recourse if they are harmed by substandard medical care.  Rothstein, supra 
note 93, at 151-52. 
150. No state has explicitly conferred liability protections for certain specified classes of actions taken by 
health care workers during an emergency, but instead they generally provide general protections for any 
care provided in good faith and in the absence of gross negligence. See, e.g., MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 14-3A-06 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2011); WYO. STAT. § 35-4-114 (2010) (“[A]ny health 
care provider or other person who in good faith follows the instructions of the state health officer in res-
ponding to the public health emergency is immune from any liability arising from complying with those 
instructions,” excluding “acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct . . 
. .”). 
